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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis seeks to examine the principle of ultra vires and the local authorities’ decisions in 
relation to the style of drafting of the enabling legislation in England. Local authorities are 
corporations established by a statute and are required to perform activities within the statutory 
powers.1 Local authorities in England derive their powers from the Local Government Act 1972 
and are required to act within those powers. Decisions taken by local authorities beyond their 
legal powers are declared invalid and ultra vires. The term ultra vires literally means ‘beyond 
legal powers’. However, local authorities may be given powers which are incidental to the 
express powers provided in the legislation.2  
 
The principle of ultra vires ensures that local authorities do not exceed their legal powers. Thus, 
in Attorney General v Fulham3 it was held that a proposal to undertake a laundry service was 
outside the local authority’s express powers to provide baths and wash houses. It may not be 
simple to differentiate between the decision that is declared ultra vires and the one taken outside 
jurisdiction. A decision that is ultra vires and a decision in excess of jurisdiction are sometimes 
given wide meanings.4 A local authority which acts “outside jurisdiction” or “without legal 
power to act”, acts beyond its statutory powers and its decisions are declared ultra vires and have 
no legal effect.5 Consequently, administrative courts hear challenges on the basis that decision 
makers misinterpret legislation that govern certain aspects of their daily activities. For instance, 
                                                            
1 Boroness Wenlock v River Dee co. (1885) 10 AC. 354 at 362  
2 Barbara Turner, Law for Councillors (Sweet and Maxwell 1986) 113. 
3 [1921] 1 ch. 440. 
4 Hugh Southey, Judicial Review: A Practical Guide (Jordan Publishing Limited 2004) 39. 
5 HWR. Wade and C.F Forsyth, Administrative Law (10th ed OUP 2009)30. 
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in criminal matters, challenges that argue that legislations that give rise to an offence or statutes 
that govern admission of evidence were wrongly interpreted.6  
 
It is important therefore that the legislature prescribes detailed, express and relevant procedures 
for local authorities that should be followed in taking decisions. Legislatures are also required to 
determine the intention of the legislation to ensure the rule of electorate. However, the legislature 
may not legislate in details and in some cases local authorities’ legislations confer wide powers 
and fail to indicate the scope of powers of the authorities. Consequently, local authorities may 
exceed their legal powers and take unlawful decisions due to insufficient legislative guidance. 
Nonetheless, the wide powers so provided to local authorities by legislature, although not 
specified in legislation, enable them develop their areas. It requires that the legislation provides 
detailed instructions to the audience.   
 
However, when drafting, drafters also rarely provide express limits and sufficient guidance about 
which considerations that are properly relevant to the exercise of discretion and which are not. 
The prime responsibility of the drafter in drafting legislation is to draft laws that give precise 
effect to the intention of the initiators of the legislation.7 Principles of judicial review on the 
other hand should be articulated or else be developed by the judiciary. Consequently, the 
presence of such drafting imperfections in legislation may provide sufficient grounds to justify 
the need for court intervention possibly for the development of common law principles to fill the 
legislative vacuum for purposes of good administration and to ensure that powers of public 
decision making bodies are exercised lawfully.  
                                                            
6 Southey (n4) 37. 
7 IML Turnbull, ‘Clear Legislative Drafting: New Approaches in Australia’(1990) Vol. 11 SLR 164. 
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Also, it is argued that the courts’ intervention is required in order to apply the principle of ultra 
vires. This enables the local authorities perform other activities that are not expressly authorized 
but which are incidental to the express powers. This is illustrated in the case of Attorney General 
v Crayford Urban District Council.8 Also, it is important to note that this is a common law rule 
that is clearly stated in Hazell v Hammersmith & Fulham LBC.9 Additionally, in certain cases, 
such activities that are incidental to or consequential are intra vires provided they are undertaken 
under a relevant section of Local Government Act. The local authority legislation needs therefore 
to provide sufficient guidance to local authorities in order to take decisions that are free from 
judicial challenge. In addition, the local authority enabling legislations need to confer powers in 
express terms to authorize local authorities perform their activities within limits of those powers 
in order to guarantee validity of the resultant decisions.   
 
The hypothesis of this thesis is that valid administrative decisions from local authorities are 
guaranteed via clear and precise enabling clauses in the primary legislation. The thesis argues 
that the style of drafting local authorities’ legislations influences decisions taken by local 
authorities. First, legislations need to be drafted in a style that clearly and precisely spells out the 
limits of powers of the local authorities in order to provide sufficient guidance to local 
authorities’ administrators to act lawfully. In attempting to exercise implied powers conferred by 
the imprecise enabling legislation, however, local authorities tend to go beyond intended legal 
powers and as a result take unreasonable, arbitrary and invalid decisions. More so, drafters rarely 
provide sufficient guidance about which considerations are properly relevant to the exercise of 
discretion and which are not.  
                                                            
8 [1962] 2 W.L.R 998. 
9[1991] 1All E.R .545, H.L. 
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Secondly, obscure, wide and ambiguous enabling clauses in the primary legislations are 
substantial causes of courts’ misinterpretation of legislation as understanding the limits of the 
powers of the local authorities is a challenge. On the other hand, it is questionable whether the 
whole range of activities performed by a local authority by invoking implied powers, while 
exercising discretion, under the umbrella of doing anything that is calculated to facilitate or is 
conducive to or incidental to the discharge of any of its functions can be regarded as lawful. This 
thesis attempts to respond to that question. Although the principle of ultra vires requires the strict 
observance of the limits of the powers conferred in legislation, local authorities tend to invoke 
widely drafted provisions to perform activities that are said to be incidental to the express powers 
of which courts may declare invalid.10  
 
Therefore, in order to prove the above hypothesis, I will discuss briefly the notions of the validity 
and invalidity of local authority administrative decisions in relation to misuse of discretion 
conferred by the enabling legislation. The reason for making such a functional relationship is that 
there is need to prove whether invoking obscure, imprecise and ambiguous enabling clauses 
which confer wide powers is a substantial cause of misinterpretation of legislation, a leeway for 
local authorities to engage in improper purposes and a cause of performing unlawful acts.11 
Besides, judicial decisions that rendered invalid such acts performed on the basis of lack of clear 
and express clauses on limits of powers of local authorities will be identified. 
 
                                                            
10 Attorney General v Wilts United Diaries (1921) 37 TLR 884, Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham London 
Borough Council [1991] 2 WLR 372. 
11 Credit Suisse v Allerdale Borough Council (1994); see also John Alder, Constitutional and Administrative Law 
(8th edn Macmillan Publishers 2011) 376. 
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Further, I will argue that clarity, precision and unambiguity are tools for effectiveness of the 
local authority enabling legislation.12 I will discuss the relevancy of clarity, precision and 
unambiguity in effectiveness of local authority legislations in relation to determination of express 
or implied powers in relevant legislation. The reason for applying these criteria is to indicate 
their role in giving effect to the legislation. The local authority legislations which are widely or 
narrowly construed prove to be unpredictable, so, clarity, precision and unambiguity promote 
readability, certainty and predictability of the legislation, and give rise to no serious controversy 
and reduce subsequent judicial misinterpretation of the law.13 And, therefore, unless the local 
authorities invoke clear, precise and unambiguous enabling clauses, they may be subject to 
constraints imposed by the principle of ultra vires.14 
 
Additionally, prominent writers, jurists and legislative drafters have put forward useful literature 
on relevancy of clarity, precision and unambiguity in legislation and all this wealthy literature 
will be incorporated in the discussion. It is worth noting, however, that since it is a common 
practice for local authorities to rely on statutory implied powers and perform unlawful acts while 
circumventing central government’s imposed controls, the need for an effective legislation with 
precise and express powers is a prerequisite for local authorities to act within legal limits in order 
to perform lawful acts.15 Although, flexibility of local authorities’ legislation is useful, at times 
express statutory powers will be applicable in their strict sense. This is based on the view that the 
legislature may not legislate for every detail. But also, it is unrealistic to say that the local 
authorities can always operate strictly within the limits of the legislation. However, the flexibility 
                                                            
12 Constantin stefanou and Helen Xanthaki (eds), Drafting Legislation: A Modern Approach (Ashgate Publishing Co 
2008) 12. 
13 R. (Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health [2003] 2 W.L.R 692, 697. 
14 Michael T Molan, Administrative Law (3rd edn Old Bailey Press 2001) 84. 
15 Ibid 83. 
   
6 
 
of local authority legislation may be invoked by local authorities to misuse their discretion and 
engage in improper purposes, in pretext of performing incidental functions. On the other hand, in 
certain instances, the legislation does not provide sufficient guidance on which considerations 
are properly relevant to the exercise of their discretion in performing incidental functions. In 
such instances, the local authorities are not provided with specific powers to perform valid acts.16  
 
In relation to the above, when the local authority legislation confers discretion and it does not 
provide express control guide lines of such powers, courts may assume that the intention of the 
legislature is to legislate in accordance with the principle of the rule of law and thus the 
authorities are required to act in the parameters of the principle.17 Therefore, one may not deny 
the court’s justification for intervention to fill the legislative gaps if the legislature enacts 
legislation which confers wide discretion to the authorities. It should be noted, however, that 
courts should apply and interpret the widely drafted enabling clauses fairly and reasonably and 
set precise limits of the powers of the authorities.18   
 
Further, in proving the hypothesis, I will analyze the drafting style of local authority legislations. 
Specifically, section 111 of the Local Government Act 1972 and section 2 of the Local 
Government Act 2000 will be analyzed. The reasons for selecting these sections are; firstly, the 
former seems to be imprecise and ambiguous in its definition of the functions of local authorities 
and confers wide discretion that may empowers to engage in improper purposes and perform 
unlawful activities, and secondly, the latter seems to be drafted in broad terms and enables the 
                                                            
16 Brian Thompson, Textbook on Constitutional and Administrative Law (2nd edn Blackstone Press Limited 1995) 
386. 
17 Mark Elliott, Jack Beatson, Martin Mathews, Administrative Law: Text and Materials, ( Jack Beatson and Martin 
Mathews 4th edn, Oxford University Press 2005) 21. 
18 Ibid 
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authorities to indulge in performance of functions that are beyond their express limits. Also, 
along with the critic, various court cases that rendered invalid local authorities’ decisions on the 
basis of the drafting style of those sections will be identified. The reason for this analysis is to 
find out whether invoking broad enabling clauses with wide discretion coupled with insufficient 
legislative guidance in the sections are a justification for judicial misinterpretation and thus a 
ground for invalidity of decisions taken. Finally, after the discussion and analysis of the above 
sections and after establishing my hypothesis I intend to use primary and secondary sources and 
from which I will draw the conclusion of my thesis. 
 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter one introduces the overview of the principle of 
ultra vires and the local authorities’ decisions in relation to the style of drafting of enabling 
legislation. Also, in the same chapter, the hypothesis and the reasons to defend it have been 
stated, followed by the methodology on how the hypothesis will be proved. The reasons on 
which the methodology is based are also highlighted, and the structure of the whole thesis is 
presented.  
 
Chapter two comprises the discussion of the notions of validity and invalidity of local 
authorities’ decisions in relation to exercise of express or implied powers conferred in the 
enabling clauses. The role of the judicial intervention in attempting to control the invalidity of 
the decisions of the local authorities is also discussed.  
 
Chapter three examines the criteria of effectiveness of the local authority enabling legislation 
which is at times obscure, uncertain or is so widely drafted that misinterpretation of the clear 
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limits of the powers of the local authority is inevitable. The relevancy of the criteria in the local 
authority legislation in relation to exercise of express or implied powers is further discussed. 
Also in this chapter, court cases that rendered invalid local authority decisions on the basis of 
drafting imperfections of the local authority legislations are identified as well.  
 
Chapter four analyzes the style of drafting of the local authority legislation. It analyzes two 
selected and widely drafted sections of two particular local authority Acts. The sections seem to 
have been drafted in a style that ambiguously or broadly defines the limits of the powers of the 
local authorities thus provoking the authorities to take decisions beyond their legal powers. Court 
cases that declared such decisions of the local authorities’ invalid on the basis of invoking 
enabling clauses with such drafting imperfections are also identified to prove my hypothesis. 
Lastly, chapter five is the conclusion of my thesis and it is based on the discussion in the thesis 
and findings of my hypothesis. 
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CHAPTER 2: VALIDITY AND INVALIDITY OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES’ DECISIONS 
AND CONTROL OF THE INVALIDITY OF DECISIONS 
 
To achieve validity of their decisions, local authorities are required to exercise their powers 
conferred by the enabling legislation. In case the legislation confers discretion to the authority, 
then the legislature ought to precisely state how the discretion of the authorities will be 
exercised. However, imposing restrictions on the local authorities’ discretion would be limiting 
their performance and therefore unhelpful to the authorities’ effectiveness and will hinder their 
innovative initiatives. This chapter examines the prerequisites of the validity of the decisions, 
reasons for the invalidity of authorities’ decisions as well as the courts’ intervention as a means 
to check on the invalidity as a result of excessive use of powers inherent in the legislation, to 
ensure the respect of the principle of ultra vires, set limits for the exercise of powers of the local 
authorities, ensure compatibility of the national legislation with the Human Rights Act 1998, to 
respect the right to appeal of aggrieved individuals, and to ensure that the intention of the 
legislature is upheld, powers not usurped, exceeded or abused to ensure the respect of the rule of 
law. 
2.1 Validity of Local Authorities’ decisions 
Local authorities acquire powers from the enabling legislation and must exercise such powers 
within the limits of the legislation.19 There shall be either express authority provided by 
legislation for any action to be done or it may be reasoned from interpretation of the legislation.20 
But reasoning from interpretation may mislead local authorities and take invalid decisions as 
                                                            
19 John Sharland,  A Practical Approach to Local Government Law (2nd ed OUP 2006) 79; see also Mark Elliot, 
Jackson Beatson, Martin Mathews, Administrative Law: Text and Materials, (Jack Beatson and Martin Mathew 4th 
edn, Oxford University Press 2005) 11 
20 SH  Bailey, cross on principles of Local Government Law(3rd edn Sweet and Maxwell 2004) 11 
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interpretations vary. In England, local authorities take their decisions on the basis of Local 
Government Act 1972 and they are required to act within the powers the Act confers. 
Nonetheless, the legislation is defined widely to provide excessive powers to the authorities. For 
instance, s111 of the Local Government Act 1972, enables local authorities to do anything which 
is calculated to facilitate, or is conducive or incidental to, the discharge of any of its functions.21 
But the section contains loose expressions like “function” and “incidental”. They are not 
precisely defined. s2 of the local Government Act 2000 also gives powers to local authorities to 
do anything which they consider is likely to promote or improve the economic wellbeing of their 
area, the environment and the social wellbeing of their area.22 The section, however, does not 
state any criteria to be applied in order to know what should be considered in terms of promoting 
or improving the economic or social wellbeing of the area. More so, the legislation is not 
designed in the style that defines the precise limits of the powers. It does not also indicate guide 
lines for exercising powers that are incidental to the express powers.  However, not only the 
drafting style of legislation has a functional relationship with the validity of the local authorities’ 
decisions but also the use of powers conferred to the authorities in the discharge of their duties 
needs to be used as drafted in the legislation and duties imposed on the authority needs to be 
fully enforced.23  
 
Nonetheless, there are certain procedural requirements that need not be regularly respected. For 
instance in Coney v Choyce24, failure to comply with legal procedures is not necessarily a reason 
                                                            
21 Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council [1991] 1 All ER 545, see also Local Government 
Act 1972, s. 111(1). 
22 Local Government Act 2000, s 2. 
23 Martin Loughlin, Legality and Locality: The Role of Law in Central-Local Government Relations( Clarendon 
Press 1996)  390. 
24 [1975] 1 ALL  ER 979. 
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to render a decision of the authority invalid and ineffective. The legislature’s failure to expressly 
provide in legislation for the consequences of such a failure to comply is an assumption that the 
legislature guarantees discretion to courts to determine whether the procedure is mandatory, in 
which case a failure to comply with requirement will lead to invalidity of the decision taken by 
the authority, or if it is directory, the deviation or non compliance with the procedures may be 
considered as a mere irregularity and not affecting the validity of the decision. Importantly, the 
courts are required to assess the legislative intent and consequences of failure to comply before 
declaration of any decision.  
 
In addition, validity of local authorities’ decisions will be upheld until they are set aside. 
However, this would be compromising the operation of the principle of ultra vires because 
unlawful acts would be maintained. An individual who wishes to challenge the validity of the 
decisions must have appropriate locus standi. If such a challenge is initiated by a person who 
does not have standing and outside the time limit provided by the legislation, the court will treat 
the decision as valid.25 However, failure to specify in legislation the consequences of such failure 
to respect the time clause is seen as a drafting defect in the legislation and the courts may 
indicate what the consequences are.26 Such time limit clauses, however, do not preclude legal 
challenge per se but they are partial ouster clauses to provide for legal challenge in a specific 
time.27 The courts, on the other hand, need to decide if the duty to specify whether the failure of 
the legislation to specify the consequences of failure to indicate results is mandatory or directory 
and determine if the decision is valid or invalid  respectively. Importantly, in deciding such a 
                                                            
25 Bailey, Jones and Mowbray: Cases, Materials and Commentary on Administrative Law (4th edn Sweet and 
Maxwell 2005) 861. 
26 Jonathan Manning, Judicial Review Proceedings: A Practitioner’s guide to Advice and Representation (2nd edn 
2004) 192. 
27 Neil Parpworth, Constitutional and Administrative Law (2nd edn Oxford University Press 2010 ) 296. 
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case above, the courts are required to consider the purpose of the legislation, the rationale of the 
provision not respected, the relationship between the clause and the purpose of the legislation 
and consequences suffered by the applicant.28 
 
The court may also decide not to intervene if the decision taken is partly lawful and partly 
unlawful. For instance a decision taken by an authority within its jurisdiction and partly in 
excessive powers; or partly for lawful purposes and partly for unlawful ones; or if certain 
procedural requirements are not respected. In such a case, the court may decide not to set aside 
such a decision and instead uphold its validity if the lawful part is dominant. This is what is 
called severance or partial invalidity. In DPP v Hutchinson,29 it was held that the court should 
refrain from speculating about what the authority would have done if it had properly applied its 
mind to the nature of its powers. It should instead determine whether there has been a valid 
exercise of the legislative power in relation to the matter which is the subject of disputed 
enforcement. The issue is whether the invalid part of the by-law would be severable from the 
valid one.30 This implies that if a legislative instrument is made with limited powers and it is 
challenged, the court will determine whether there is any valid decision made on the basis of the 
limited power of the instrument. The court, however, cannot modify an invalid legislation made 
in excess powers. 
 
2.2 Invalidity of Local Authorities’ decisions 
Deliberately thwarting the intentions of the legislation is considered by courts as unacceptable 
act. Any local authority that attempts to refuse to adhere to requirements of the legislation takes 
                                                            
28 Manning (n28) 194. 
29[1990] 2 AC 783. 
30 Paul Craig, Administrative Law( 6th edn Sweet and Maxwell 2008 )785. 
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an invalid decision. For instance, In Taylor v Munrow (1960),31 the council simply refused to 
respect an enabling clause that authorize  rent increment, and in Backhouse v Lambeth London 
Borough Council, the council’s attempt to bypass a general rent increase by increasing the rent 
on one unoccupied council house was not successful. Local authorities are required to exercise 
powers spelt expressly or by implication. Any decisions taken outside the powers spelt in 
legislation are subject to judicial challenge and declared invalid.32 The ultra vires principle 
ensures that the legislation of the local authority should be respected and that it does not take on 
a role beyond that intention of the legislation.33 However, if an enabling clause provides too 
much discretion and provides no guidelines to exercise it, uncertainty is expected.  If it provides 
express limits of the powers to the local authority, its application should be merely an exercise of 
construing the statutory language and applying it to the facts.34  
 
Also, the legislation which provides excessive powers gives rise to different interpretations and 
confusion. Therefore, any local authority action taken “outside jurisdiction” or “without power to 
decide” is declared invalid and ultra vires, has no legal leg to stand on and it is legally 
ineffective.35 However, it is argued that such actions are said to have effects until they are set 
aside by a relevant court.36  
 
Local authorities’ legislations have provided extensive powers to local authorities to account for 
their activities, and it is argued that such wide discretion has been so granted due to two reasons: 
                                                            
31 [1960] 1 WLR 151; [1972]  116 SJ 802. 
32 O. Hood Phillips and Paul Jackson, Constitutional and Administrative Law (7th ed Sweet and Maxwell 1987) 600. 
33 Ian leigh, Law, Politics, and Local Democracy (OUP 2000) 38. 
34 Wade (n 5) 30. 
35 Ibid 31. 
36 [1997] QB 306. 
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Firstly, in order to effect wide controls and to delegate such wide powers in terms of delegated 
legislation in order to increase administrative powers while devising them since the increasing 
size and the complexity of regulation accompanied by legislature’s lack of sufficient time and 
enough capacity to draft for every details. The legislature in this case creates various local 
authorities and delegates powers to them to enable them acquire specific powers to perform 
activities that best suit their areas; and secondly, that many issues are to be approached at a 
technical perspective.37 But since local authorities are provided with insufficient guidance, the 
wide discretion is misused in performing unlawful acts. Also, the legislations present legislative 
complexities due to the style of drafting. Consequently, such legislations are uncertain and have 
frustrated the inherent intention and the courts have declared the decisions of the local authorities 
invalid and ineffective. 
 
Local authorities’ decisions may also be challenged on the grounds of misuse of its discretion. 
For instance, the decision can be challenged if the authority performs an illegal act that is to say, 
if the enabling clause does not provide powers to do it, or even if it provides powers to do it, and 
the authority performs it in an unlawful manner.38 While discretion is necessary for the local 
authorities, the legislature does not provide sufficient guidance on the relevant considerations 
regarding the use of such discretion. But again, guidance on such discretion would imply 
limitations. Since local authorities are autonomous bodies, limiting their discretion would be 
interfering with their autonomy. Further, invalidity may be declared if the authority invokes a 
statutory power for a collateral purpose, one that is related to the purpose for which the power 
                                                            
37 D. J. Galliga, Administrative Law (Oxford University Press 1996) 275. 
38 David Foulkes, Administrative Law (8th edn Butterworths 1995) 199; see also Elizabeth Yates, Local Authorities 
and outside organizations: A Legal Perspective (Sweet and Maxwell 1996) 120. 
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was granted.39 This may be due to the discretion that may be conferred by the enabling clause. 
However, the discretion conferred must be used in the interest of the public, and in conformity 
with the legislative intention.40 The discretion must be inferred from the construction of the 
legislation and be read as a whole and not to be applied in purposes outside the intention of the 
legislation.41  A decision made for an improper purpose, is contrary to law and it conflicts with 
express legislative language. The power should not be used for any other collateral purpose.42 
The analysis we can make here is that the discretion is required to promote, and not to fail, the 
policy and general objectives of the legislation.43 However, a legislation that confers wide 
discretion, coupled with no guidance of its exercise, may fail the intention of the legislation 
because of lack of controls. However, if there exists no controls of the discretion and the local 
authority considers certain matters while taking decisions and the general interpretation of the 
statute are held by the court to be irrelevant, then this will amount to a drafting imperfection.  
 
In a related context, in R v Inner London Education Authority, ex. Parte Westminster City 
Council44, it was held that the employment of an advertising agency to conduct a campaign 
against the government’s rate capping policy was unlawful as one of the authority’s purposes 
was that of persuading members of the public to its own views and this was a legally irrelevant 
consideration. However, this will depend on the language of the enabling clause and how it is 
drafted. If the enabling clause is drafted in a style that gives the decision an unrestricted, 
subjective discretion using such expressions that are vague or ambiguous in the legislation to the 
                                                            
39 Wade (n5) 42. 
40 Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997. 
41 R. v Somerset County Council ex p Fewings [1995] 3 ALL ER 20. 
42 Galloway v Mayor and commonalty of London (1866) L.R. 1 H.L. 34. 
43 Bromley LBC v GLC [1983] AC. 768, HL. 
44[1986] 1 W.L.R. 28. 
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extent that the decision maker is motivated by an improper purpose, or is unable to consider 
relevant considerations while taking the decision, the decision may be declared invalid.45But also 
a decision maker may ignore relevant consideration on the basis of the construction of the 
enabling clause.46 For instance, if the relevant consideration is spelt out in the legislation but 
with ambiguous phrases as ‘shall consider whether the so and so is fit and proper’, ‘if the 
Minister thinks fit’, ‘if the local authority considers it appropriate’, the decision maker, in this 
context may even go further and exercise discretion and consider other “relevant considerations” 
that are implied in the legislation.47  
 
Although the decision maker has followed what is stipulated in the legislation, he acts illegally 
by putting into account an irrelevant consideration. In such a case courts get a leeway to impose 
their own view as to what is relevant and they may declare the decision invalid and ultra vires.48 
But such interference may be considered as usurping the powers of the local authorities by 
courts, and courts are not experts in what best suits the local areas inhabitants. Instead, the 
solution to what should be considered relevant or irrelevant considerations need to be identified 
through drafting of clear and express enabling clauses.49 This means therefore that any deviation 
from such express limits of the provisions is a neglect of the legal obligation thus any decision 
taken on the basis of such a clause may be rendered invalid and declared ultra vires. 
 
Local authorities’ decisions may also be declared invalid as a result of failure to comply with 
mandatory consultation. Consultation is a formal legal requirement for the authority to take valid 
                                                            
45 Revision Work Book, Administrative Law, (2nd edn Old Bailey Press 2002) 103. 
46 AP Le Sueur and J W Herberg, Constitutional and Administrative Law (Cavandish Publishing Limited 1995) 208. 
47 Ibid 
48 Alder (n11) 383. 
49 Ibid  
   
17 
 
decisions. Since consultation is a fundamental component of the exercise of the authority’s 
functions, therefore the view that consultation as a statutory requirement is a prerequisite to the 
exercise of decision-making powers holds.50 Consultation is mandatory.51 However, failure to 
consult, unless there is a failure to respect a legal obligation does not render a decision invalid.52 
Where the enabling clause so requires, consultation should be conducted. If authorities fail to 
comply with this legal obligation, the subsequent decision will be invalid. But consultations on 
the other hand create delays in administrative procedures and may trigger expectations of the 
consulted parties even if the views of the consulted parties are not expressed.  
 
2.3 Control of the invalidity of local authorities’ decisions  
Local authorities are subject to judicial control if they take any decisions exceeding limits of 
their powers.53 Such powers are intended to be exercised only for purposes authorized by the 
enabling legislation. Therefore, if courts declare invalid and ultra vires any decisions taken by 
the local authorities beyond its legislative powers, then this is not usurping the powers of the 
local authorities, it is instead controlling unlawful acts of the authorities.54 And if in turn local 
authorities accept the obligation to justify their powers by reference to the enabling clauses, then 
courts intervention where local authorities exceed their powers is justified. However, the courts 
lack expertise, practical competence and do not sufficient knowledge in local authority related 
issues. And courts are not superintendents of local authorities. Nonetheless, local authorities’ 
legislations are so broad that the authorities tend to stray beyond the intended powers and take 
                                                            
50 Arden Chambers, A Guide to Greater London Authority (Sweet and Maxwell 2000) 33. 
51 R. Secretary of State for Social Services, ex p. Association of Metropolitan Authorities [1986] 1 W.L.R. 1. 
52 R. v Devon CC, ex p. Baker [1995] 1 All ER 73, 85. 
53 Hilaire Barnett, Constitutional and Administrative Law (8th edn Cavendish Publishing Limited 2011) 336. 
54 Ibid 
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unlawful decisions;55 therefore the rule of ultra vires must ensure that the authorities do not 
operate beyond their legislative powers.56 In addition, any person affected by an action of the 
local authority may take an appeal to administrative tribunal, on a point of law, which includes 
error of law, unfair process, and unlawful exercise of discretion.57  
 
Also, a person who claims that the action of a local authority is unlawful and in contradiction 
with the Human Rights Act 1998 may justify it before the courts and claim for damages. If the 
court finds that the decision taken under the enabling legislation is unlawful and in breach of any 
of the Human Rights Act provisions, on the basis of s3 of the Human Rights Act, it can declare 
the incompatibility of the enabling legislation with the Human Rights Act.58 However, for the 
sake of protecting the declaration of the incompatibility of the earlier legislation with the Human 
Rights Act, and save it from the interpretation of article 3 of the Human Rights Act, inclusion of 
an express provision in the enabling legislation with an intention to disregard the operations of 
the Human Rights Act would be necessary. In case of lack of express provisions in the enabling 
legislation, the courts presume that even the most general words are intended to be in favor of the 
provisions of the Human Rights Act. In any case, judges in England are required to interpret any 
legislation consistently with the Human Rights Act 1998.59 Therefore, since the judiciary is 
required to interpret any clause of the Human Rights Act in a manner that is consistent with any 
legislation in England, then the assumption that the court is seeking the parliamentary intention 
is untrue and instead the judge applies his judgment and see if the language in the legislation is 
                                                            
55 Richard Gordon, Judicial Review: Law and Procedure (2nd edn Sweet and Maxwell 1996) 208. 
56 Ibid 
57 Timothy Endicott, Administrative Law (2nd edn Oxford University press 2011) 356. 
58 Ibid 357. 
59 Human Rights Act 1998, s 3(1). 
   
19 
 
compatible with the Human Rights Act. As a matter of constitutional practice, significant power 
has therefore been transferred to the judiciary.  
 
Further, an aggrieved person may file a claim against any local authority in courts.60 The courts 
may hear appeals against such decisions where such a right to appeal is conferred in the 
legislation and issues a declaration that the action was unlawful.61 The right to appeal against the 
decision depends on the enabling clause conferring the powers to appeal and the rights to appeal 
are inherent in the legislation.62 Courts, in reviewing such cases, are concerned with only errors 
of fact.63 The exception is however, if the legislation is construed in such a style that the 
legislature authorizes that an appeal shall lie on the merits or, that the error has caused the 
authority to act ultra vires. Nonetheless, the courts may intervene in normal circumstances in 
correcting errors of law if the legislation is express in providing such a right, the errors of law 
appear on the face of the record of proceedings and the error has caused the authority to act ultra 
vires.64   
 
The essence of such judicial control of local authorities decisions’ is to ensure that the legislative 
intent is upheld, statutory powers not usurped, exceeded or abused and that substantive or 
procedural duties owed to the individual are performed as legislation requires. But in certain 
instances, judges act as supervisors of local authority administrators and penetrate in the 
authorities’ powers. But judges are not supervisors of the authorities instead  they ensure respect 
                                                            
60 B.L Jones and K Thompson, Garner’s Administrative Law (8th edn Butterworths 1996) 151. 
61 Bailey (n 21) 409.   
62 Jones (n 27) 162. 
63 Bailey (n 21) 409. 
64 Ibid 
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of the rule of law,65 a context, in which Craig argues that when the legislature passes legislation, 
the courts will impose control mechanisms which are justified on grounds of justice and 
maintenance of the rule of law.66 However, the legislature rarely provides sufficient guidance in 
legislation as to what constitutes the principles of judicial review. So if the legislature does not 
explicitly indicate procedures for control of the local authorities, then, it has to explicitly make it 
clear.67 Therefore, if the legislature fails to clearly indicate the limits of judicial control on the 
local authorities, then the legislation will be ineffective and certainly courts are required to 
determine the procedural and substantive principles of judicial review or else invoke principles 
of common law to supplement the legislative intent. However, courts rely on presumptions of 
interpretation which may reflect perceptions of the community values, although this does not 
mean public opinion.68 While interpreting legislation, however, in order to uphold the legislative 
intent and to enable the local authorities act within the scope of the legislation and ensure the 
respect of the rule of law, judges need to act reasonably. Moreover, an effective enabling 
legislation that is free from obscurity, imprecision and unambiguity is crucial. It is of practical 
significance that drafters, while pursuing effectiveness of legislation, pay much attention to 
clarity, precision and unambiguity which are discussed in the next chapter.   
 
                                                            
65 Jones (n 27) 162. 
66 Craig (n 32) 21. 
67 Ibid 
68 Alder (n 11) 376. 
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CHAPTER 3: SEARCH FOR EFFECTIVENESS OF LOCAL AUTHORITY ENABLING 
LEGISLATION  
Drafters are required to write clear and easily understood local authority enabling legislations. 
Effectiveness of the enabling legislation requires that the legislation be clear and plain to avoid 
equivocation, enhance transparence in governance of local authorities and for maintenance of the 
rule of law. The law must be formulated with sufficient precision to enable the local authorities 
take decisions within the limits of the enabling clause and to enable the audience of the 
legislation to clearly understand with certainty the requirements of the law and consequences of 
failure to comply with it. However, many local authority legislations are formulated with 
ambiguity, vagueness and in broad terms and their interpretation and application cause practical 
challenges. This chapter examines three criteria namely; clarity, precision and unambiguity, 
which drafters are required to apply in drafting legislation to avoid ambiguity and to ensure that 
intended purpose of the legislation is commonly understood, validity of decisions is embraced, 
courts relieved from the several case logs, intended interpretation of legislation is achieved, 
controversy among the litigants and the level of judicial applications are tremendously reduced, 
and that the law achieves credibility and effectiveness it deserves. 
 
3.1 Clarity 
According to Compact Oxford English Dictionary, clarity is defined as the state or quality of 
being clear and easily perceived or understood.69 Lord Denning recommended that for purposes 
of achieving effectiveness of legislation, the first principle is to adopt simpler language and 
                                                            
69 C Soanes (ed), Compact Oxford English Dictionary ( 2nd edn OUP 2003) 193. 
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shorter sentences; that simplicity and clarity of language are essential.70 However, Miers rejects 
the view that the legislation that accurately expresses the government’s intentions is the one 
whose provisions are clearly and precisely stated.71 On the contrary, Daniel Greenberg argues 
that the use of clear language is not a luxury or a fad, but a fundamental necessity of legislative 
drafting.72 Daniel also cautions of the constraints of the system in which a piece of legislation 
that is not clear as it might have been is produced, may account for clarity as well.73  
 
Clarity in legislation is very important because it eliminates any other meaning that may 
compromise the purpose of the legislation. Keith argues that since the local authority legislation 
is drafted in broad terms, it may well be that its wording is wide and generous,74 and therefore 
may lack clarity thus causing equivocation in the legislation and as a result any subsequent act 
performed by the authority is likely to be declared invalid and ultra vires. Local authorities in 
certain instances exceed the limits of the powers due to obscure legislation. As earlier noted, the 
legislature lacks sufficient time to legislate for every detail, and drafters rarely provide sufficient 
legislative guidance to demarcate the boundaries of the local authorities while taking decisions. 
A piece of legislation that is obscure, widely drafted and inconsistent is not easily understood. 
The legislation becomes uncertain and unpredictable. For instance, in Staden v Tarjanyi,75 a by-
law was quashed due to lack of certainty. The by-law made it unlawful to fly a glider “in a 
pleasure ground.” It was stated that for a byelaw to be valid, it must be certain and clear in the 
sense that anyone engaged upon the otherwise lawful pursuit must know with reasonable 
                                                            
70 The Renton Report on The preparation of Legislation CMND 6053 (1975) p 27; see also JF Burrows and RI 
Carter, Statute Law in New Zealand ( 4th edn LexisNexis 2009) 116. 
71 D.R Miers and A C Page, Legislation (Sweet and Maxwell 1982) 90. 
72 Daniel Greenberg, Craies on Legislation (9th edn Sweet and Maxwell 2008) 337. 
73 Ibid 339. 
74 Keith Davis, Local Government Law( Butterworths 1983) 59. 
75(1980) 78 LGR  614. 
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certainty when he is breaking the law and when he is not breaking the law. This means that an 
uncertain and obscure byelaw is invalid. Also, an uncertain and obscure bylaw does not provide 
sufficient guidance to the reader and hence it fails to demarcate between the legal act and the 
illegal one. 
 
In the above context therefore, any person who may be penalized under the by-law cannot 
understand which act is unlawful. The by-law lacks certainty and does not clearly indicate when 
and where flying the glider becomes illegal. Many modern statutes, however, result not only 
from the use of obscure terminology, but also from the complexity of the subject matter, coupled 
with the fact that most changes in the law have to be knitted into the complex fabric of existing 
of statutory provisions; and the legislature is not always receptive to the best popular language, 
sometimes preferring lawyerly language.76 However, a by-law cannot be struck down due to its 
uncertainty but it can be void if it is meaningless but not because it is uncertain.  Even though, a 
statute is obscure, or has several meanings, the courts have to identify its meaning instead of 
nullifying it.77  
 
Clarity in legislation enhances transparence in governance in local authorities. For this to be 
successful, the intention of the legislation needs to be expressed and communicated to the 
governed in a clear and direct manner. Cane argues that the requirement of clarity in legislation 
is a desideratum of valid law independent of any notion of reasonableness and that vagueness is, 
therefore, an independent ground of judicial review.78 Thornton also supports the view that the 
                                                            
76 John Bell and George Eangle,  Statutory interpretation (Butterworths 1995) 202. 
77 Manchestership Canal v Manchester Racecourse Co [1900] 2 360-361. 
78 Peter Cane, Administrative Law (4th edn Oxford University Press 2004) 261.  
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drafter needs to write legislation clearly and to be intelligible.79 The drafting of clear and express 
enabling clauses to spell out the limits of the powers of the local authorities is a necessity for 
validity of decisions. However, Martin Loughlin argues that since local authorities have multiple 
functions of administration of the local population, their discretion is also necessary in policy 
innovative ways by providing the capacity to increase the nature of social and economic services 
they provide to the local population, who are, arguably the initiators of such innovation.80 He 
further argues that although the policy is adopted by the central government, it is sent back to the 
Local level through policy guidance and clear legislation for the readers to understand it and 
hence acknowledging the relevancy of clarity in local authority legislation as a tool for effective 
legislation without which policy implementation would be ineffective.81  
 
Clarity in local authority legislation is required for maintenance of the rule of law.82 Anne 
Seidman and co-authors say that clear enabling clauses facilitate understanding of the law, 
communicate the requirements of the law, provide what the legislation grants to the local 
population and also determine how the authorities should behave as well. To achieve that, the 
legislation should be clear and plain. It should be expressed in terms that can be easily 
understood by those who have to apply it. On the other hand, absence of clarity undermines the 
rule of law and it is unfair to those who wish to preserve the rule of law. Drafters, while drafting, 
should respect circumstances which directly affect local authorities, and give much attention to 
clarity and simplicity of expression of enabling clauses. Drafters are expected to express the 
intention of the legislation accurately. In addition, drafting instructions submitted to the drafter 
                                                            
79 G.C Thornton, Legislative Drafting (4th ed Butterworths1996) 52. 
80 Martin Loughlin, Local Government in the Modern State (Sweet and Maxwell 1986) 2. 
81 Ibid  
82 Anne Seidman, Robert B. Seidman and Nalin Abeyesekere, Legislative Drafting for Democratic Social Change: 
A Manual for Drafter (The Hague: Kruwer Law International, 2001) 255. 
   
25 
 
need to be clear and precise to provide sufficient information and not to leave him with any other 
options.83 
 
Clarity in legislation induces transformation. Loughlin believes that local authorities’ clear 
legislation enables administrators to take valid decisions and this attracts investors. This leads to 
increased development of the local areas and thus realization of the betterment of the local 
population through various services offered by innovations of the local authorities.84 However, 
clarity in legislation may be ignored due to the following reasons; firstly, if there is a need to 
utilize ambiguity for political disagreements among the groups that implement the legislation and 
those subject to it, secondly, if there is need to provide discretion to local authorities,85 and 
thirdly, to reduce the opportunities to challenge the exercise of powers conferred.86  
 
Nonetheless, such a drafting imperfection is a challenge to the respect of the rule of law since the 
readers of the legislation will not clearly understand what the legislation requires and what it 
grants to them. Also, the imperfection would not provide the courts with positive and sufficient 
guidance as to the purpose underlying a statutory provision since the legislation is vague and 
ambiguous.87 Further, it would be unreasonable to draft so obscure a legislation that its effect 
could not be assessed without incurring the expense of litigation.88 Indeed, the courts should be 
allowed to use notes on sections, explaining the purpose and intended effect of each section or 
schedule as an aid to understanding the legislation, but words contained in the legislation should 
                                                            
83 Merkur Island shipping corp. v Laughton and others [ 1983] 2 AC 570. 
84 Loughlin (n 84) 2. 
85 Ibid 257. 
86 Miers (n 75) 91. 
87 Bell (n 80) 201. 
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prevail unless they are not sufficient by themselves for determining its effect.89 The drafter 
therefore has the responsibility to give effect to local authority legislation even if the 
consequence is a reduction of clarity and precision. 
 
3.2 Precision 
According to shorter English Dictionary, precision is defined as the fact, condition or quality of 
exactness, definiteness, distinctness and accuracy.90 Helen Xanthaki argues that precision is 
traditionally viewed as the main aim of common law drafters who make the greatest effort to 
‘say all, define all; to leave nothing to the imagination; never to presume upon the reader’s 
intelligence’.91 Precision however, emphasizes detail and tends to result in complexity.92 Rick 
Bigwood emphasizes the necessity of precision in legislation so as to avoid ambiguity.93 With 
precision in legislation, the drafter attempts to predict and to provide for every eventuality, the 
drafter deals with every small point, blocks every loop hole and ties up every loose end.  
However, precision is not suitable for all legislation. Precision in drafting may be required in 
criminal statutes, revenue law, business, commerce or when broad powers could infringe on 
basic human rights.94 On the other hand, overwriting by the drafter in attempts to attain complete 
precision and unambiguity further obscures the legislation.95 
 
                                                            
89 Westminster City Council v National Asylum Support Service [2002] UKHL) 38. 
90 H W Fowler and Jessie Coulson, Shorter Oxford English Dictionary( CT Onions ed, 3rd edn, OUP 1973) 1651. 
91 H Xanthaki, ‘On Transferability of Legislative Solutions: The Functionality Test’ in: C Stefanou and HXanthaki 
(eds), Drafting Legislation: A Modern Approach (Ashgate, Aldershot 2008)10. 
92 Peter Goodrich, Reading the Law: A critical Introduction to Legal Method and Techniques (Blackwell Ltd 1986) 
52. 
93 Rick Bigwood (ed), The Statute: Making and Meaning (LexisNexis 2004) 71. 
94 Xanthaki (n 95)11. 
95 JF Burrows and RI Carter, Statute in New zealand (4th edn LexisNexis 2009)109. 
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Achievement of clarity and precision in legislation, however, requires specificity and drafters 
must pay special attention to writing their bills’ details in clearly stated legislative sentences that 
use words accurately to achieve specificity.96 Precision in local authority enabling clauses guides 
the local authority administrators to take valid and accurate decisions in the boundaries of the 
legislation. However, the proper degree of specificity may vary from one subject area to another 
and therefore it is the drafter to determine the best suitable level of specificity of the local 
authority legislation, and to consider the readers of the legislation including the judges who will 
need to interpret the legislation in order to declare valid decisions.97 The reasons for using 
precision and accuracy in legislation are clear. This point was expressed by Sir Christopher 
Jenkins, a UK First Parliamentary Counsel in a report submitted to the Select Committee on the 
Modernization of the House of Commons. He said:98 
 
“A Bill’s sole reason for existence is to change the law. The resulting Act is the law….A 
consequence of this unique function is that a Bill cannot set about communicating with the reader 
in the same way in which other forms of writing do. It cannot use the same range of tools. In 
particular, it cannot repeat the important points simply to emphasize their importance or safely to 
explain itself by restating a proposition in different words. To do so would risk creating doubts 
and ambiguities that would fuel litigation. As a result, legislation speaks in a monotone and its 
language is compressed. It is less easy for readers to get their bearings and to assimilate quickly 
what they are being told that it would be if conventional methods of helping the reader were 
freely available to the drafter”. 
 
                                                            
96 Seidman (n 88) 256. 
97 Jack Stark, The Art of the Statute (Littleton 1996) 25. 
98 First Report ‘The Legislative Process’, House of Commons Session 1997-98 (Cmnd. 190). 
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A closer analysis of the above quotation clearly shows that since legislation is not like other 
documents, therefore a drafter cannot use the same tools to communicate the intention of the 
legislation to its readers as any other writer would do in another document. To bring a positive 
consequence, repetition of important points is not advisable as it may cause doubt, rather clarity 
would be preferable. He also emphasizes that clarity makes legislation easier to read, understand 
and enables readers to do what they are required to do. 
 
Brian Hunt also realizes the relevancy of precision in legislation by advising drafters to use terms 
or words that have well established meaning and which have been reinforced by judicial 
interpretation.99 This avoids ambiguity, spells accurately the requirements of legislation and sets 
guidelines for taking the decisions. Such terms or words are chosen and used for their precise 
meaning and consistency of the meaning and readers of legislation are united in their 
understanding and interpretation.100 However, there are exceptions of the requirement of 
specificity and these are based on the following reasons; firstly, a sponsor of the legislation may 
have the drafter cover disagreement between parties by vague or ambiguous language to which 
the parties can agree; secondly, imprecision in legislation may be required if for whatever reason, 
neither the drafters nor ministerial officials are unable to prescribe procedures and criteria for 
ministerial rule. The legislation can confer discretion to the local authority or to whoever has the 
responsibility to resolve that vagueness.101 However, such discretion may be qualified to a 
greater or lesser degree, for example by requiring that it be exercised “reasonably”.102Thirdly, 
imprecision may be preferred if the drafter intends to introduce general principles in legislation 
                                                            
99 Brian Hunt, ‘Plain Language in Legislative Drafting: An Achievable Objective or A Laudable Ideal?’ (2003) 24 
(3) SLR 114. 
100 Ibid.  
101 Sideman (n 86) 258. 
102 Miers (n 75) 91. 
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and to provide a space to courts to work out their detailed application on a case basis.103 
Nonetheless, precision in drafting is essential to improve on good governance and protect the 
rule of law, and therefore to achieve this, and for the improvement of the local authority, drafters 
are required to always be conscious in order to avoid ambiguity in legislation.104  
 
3.3 Unambiguity  
Ambiguity is defined as uncertain or inexact meaning.105 Ambiguity exists when words can be 
interpreted in more than one way. Unambiguity on the other hand is defined as words or phrases 
without ambiguity.106 It simply means that the meaning is clear, explicit and unequivocal.107 
Ambiguity is the legal drafting’s chief curse and the drafter should strive to avoid it in 
legislation.108 Ambiguity is of three kinds, and these are; semantic, syntactic and contextual.109 
The term is used to mean not only ambiguity itself but also vagueness, generality and total 
failure of the legislation to address the issue at hand.110  
 
Semantic ambiguity arises when a word has more than one definition. For instance the term 
“residence”. Does it mean physical, legal, voting or permanent residence? What about the word 
Tip? It could mean:  a place where rubbish is dumped, apex of an object, tilt/incline, empty/pour, 
                                                            
103 Xanthaki (n 97) 11. 
104 Seidman (n 86) 258. 
105 Xanthaki (n 97) 9. 
106 Soanes (n 75) 1251. 
107 Kadija Kabba, ‘Gender Neutral- Language: an essential language tool to serve precision, clarity and 
unambiguity’(2011) 37  (3) SLR 430. 
108 Peter Butt and Richard Castle, Modern Legal Drafting: A Guide to Using Clearer Language ( 2nd edn CUP 2006) 
22. 
109 Robert J Martineau Michael B Salerno, Legal, Legislative, and Rule Drafting in Plain English (Thomson 2005) 
77. 
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to touch gently, a hint, a warning, or a gratuity/reward.111 However, Martineau advises that this 
kind of ambiguity can be resolved by context, but not in all cases.112 Syntactic ambiguity arises 
when there is uncertainty what a word modifies or refers back to in legislation. For instance, 
“when the governor nominates the head of a department, he shall appear before the committee 
that oversees that department”. While the requirement of the committee appearance probably 
applies only to the nominee, it could mean the governor as well. The potential confusion here can 
be eliminated by replacing “he” with “nominee”.  
 
Contextual ambiguity arises when it is unclear which of the two alternatives is intended. The 
ambiguity can be explicit or implicit, and internal or external. It is an explicit internal ambiguity 
when a legislation imposing a duty refers in one section to “persons” and another to “residents” 
or in one section to filing a document within 30 days, without any obvious reason for the 
difference. The explicit ambiguity is external if the differences are in different legislations. It 
becomes more problematic if it becomes implicit contextual ambiguity. This is a situation when 
one or more but not all members of a class are mentioned, leaving it up to the reader to decide 
whether the omission was intentional or accidental. Drafters are required to strive to draft 
legislation with a clear and intended meaning in order to avoid ambiguity and to ensure a clear 
meaning of the legislation. This facilitates in taking valid decisions and effectiveness of local 
authority legislation in general. The relevancy of unambiguity in legislation is that it does not 
leave uncertainty to the addresses.113 Instead it enhances certainty in legislation, minimizes 
judicial misinterpretation, and validity of legislation is embraced. In addition, courts will be 
                                                            
111 Hunt, (n 101)118. 
112 Martineau (n 111) 78. 
113 Ester Majambere, ‘Clarity, Precision and unambiguity: aspects for effective legislative drafting’,(2011) 37 (3) 
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deterred by clear, unambiguous and objective provisions of the legislation from intervening and 
exercising the usual measure of control in relation to discretion entrusted to local authorities.114 
However, courts will be unwilling to be deferential in relation to the exercise of discretion 
entrusted by a widely and ambiguously drafted provision,115 or if it carries out a duty 
unreasonably or in bad faith.  
 
Sandra Markman argues that unambiguity in legislation diminishes the risk of court’s 
interpretation of the legislation in different meanings especially in common law jurisdictions.116 
Indeed, a drafter who intends to clearly express the intention of legislation to the readers of 
legislation must take into account what courts have said and the reasoning they have used.117 The 
legislation drafted with broad powers is more likely to be subjected to several interpretations and 
a potential judicial challenge is inevitable, but again as earlier mentioned, the more a drafter tries 
to avoid ambiguity, the more vulnerable the legislation will be to omissions.118 Although it is a 
challenge to the drafter, it remains the role of the drafter to strike a health balance between the 
two.  
 
Hunt argues that if unambiguity and certainty reign, intended interpretation of legislation is 
achieved, controversy among the litigants and the level of judicial applications are tremendously 
reduced and the law achieves credibility it deserves.119Although Seidman supports the argument, 
he also adds that laws become ineffective if they speak ambiguously and vaguely, and that 
                                                            
114 Bailey (n27) 430. 
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development and good governance thrive on clear, unambiguous and precise legislation.120 
Unambiguity is a tool for effectiveness of legislation as it contributes to clarity and intelligibility 
of legislation. Ambiguity and uncertainty in local authority legislation lead to invalidity of their 
decisions and thus good governance and transformation which are necessary for development of 
the local population cannot survive. Thus in Kruse v Johnson121, Mathew J said: 
 
“From the many decisions on the subject it would seem clear that a by law to be valid must, 
among other conditions have two properties-it must be certain, that is, it must contain adequate 
information as to the duties of those who are to obey, and it must be reasonable.” 
 
In Scott v Pilliner122, it was held that the by-law made by a local authority was bad and cannot be 
supported because of unreasonableness and uncertainty. It was also stated in the same case that it is 
desirable for the good government of a locality that by-laws should be clear and definite, free from 
ambiguity and should not be drafted in wide terms.123 Further, non - parliamentary rules can be struck 
down if they are so vague that it is impossible to say whether they are properly related to the 
purposes for which the law-making power was conferred.124 Also, in Strickland v Hayes125 it was 
held that a by-law was not only uncertain because of the ambiguous words but also ultra vires 
because it conferred a power beyond the legal power of the county council. Nonetheless, the 
whole bylaw cannot be struck down. It may be argued that while one part of the bylaw can be 
rejected, the rest may remain good. It can therefore be severable. 
                                                            
120 Seidman (n88) 257. 
121[1898] 2 Q.B 91 at 108. 
122[1904] 2 K.B. 855. 
123 Ibid at 858. 
124 Cane (n82) 261 Peter Cane, Administrative Law (4th edn Oxford University Press 2004) 261. 
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It is fair to say that local authority legislation in England face enormous challenges ranging from 
lack of clarity, ambiguity and uncertainty as a result of the style of drafting which does not 
provide sufficient legislative guidance. Local authorities therefore stray beyond their legal limits 
and perform unlawful acts under the umbrella of performing incidental functions. A critic of 
such a drafting style is considered in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE DRAFTING STYLE OF LOCAL AUTHORITY LEGISLATION: A 
CRITICAL ANALYSIS  
 
Although local authorities use legislation as a tool to regulate activities within their areas, the 
legislature enacts legislation in a style that provides broad powers to local authorities. 
Occasionally, the legislature uses loose expressions in legislation and the authorities interpret 
them to cover something beyond what may be found in the intention of the legislature. Even 
though, it is a result of the drafting style, drafters need not be criticized for such a style of drafting as 
the drafting instructions may not be clear enough and may leave him with other options. While it is 
undeniable for local authorities to exercise powers that are incidental to express powers 
conferred by the enabling clause; and to do anything which they consider is likely to promote or 
improve the economic or social well-being of their areas, the style of drafting of the enabling 
clauses that empower the authorities to take such functions but which do not attempt to provide 
sufficient guidance on the procedures to exercise the discretion conferred deserves a critique. 
This chapter presents a critical analysis of two sections selected from two different Acts that 
empower local authorities to exercise such power. 
4.1 Section 111 of the Local Government Act 1972 
 
The section provides: 
 
“(1) Without prejudice to any powers exercisable apart from this section but subject to the 
provisions of this Act and any other enactment passed before or after this Act, a local authority 
shall have power to do anything (whether or not involving the expenditure, property or rights 
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which is calculated to facilitate, or is conducive or incidental to, the discharge of any of their 
functions…… 
 
(3) A local authority shall not by virtue of this section raise money, whether by means of rates, 
precepts or borrowing, or lend money except in accordance with the enactments relating to those 
matters respectively.” 
 
Firstly, in this section, the word “function” of the local authority is not precisely defined. In 
Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC, Lord Woolf said:126  
 
“What is a function for the purpose of the subsection is not expressly defined but in our view 
there can be little doubt that in this context ‘functions’ refers to the multiplicity of specific 
statutory activities the council expressly or impliedly under a duty to perform or has power to 
perform under the other provisions of the Act of 1972 or other relevant legislation. The 
subsection does not of itself, independently of any other provision, authorize the performance of 
any activity. It only confers, as the side note to the section indicates, a subsidiary power. A 
subsidiary power which authorizes an activity where some other statutory provision has vested a 
specific function or functions in the council and the performance of the activity will assist in 
some way in the discharge of that function or those functions.” 
 
Also, the word “function” was defined as ‘all the duties and powers of a local authority: the sum 
total of the activities Parliament has entrusted to it’.127 Similarly, it may also refer to powers a 
local authority has to perform under dependence of other provisions of 1972 Act. This means 
                                                            
126[1990] 2 Q.B. 697, 722-723. 
127 [1991] 1 All ER 545 at p. 554; see also Bailey (n 27) 396. 
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that the section does not confer powers to perform an activity that is independent of any other 
provision. It merely confers powers basing on other provisions. This lack of precise definition 
may be a justification to brand the section ambiguous and may mislead the local authorities in 
indulging in activities that are not their functions thus they may be subject to judicial scrutiny.   
 
Secondly, the word “incidental” is not objectively defined as well to describe, beyond doubt, 
what activities are incidental to functions of the local authorities. This issue was identified in 
Amalgamated society of railway servants v Osborn, where Lord Macnaghaten said:128  
 
‘‘The learned counsel for the appellants did not, as I understand their argument, venture to 
contend that the power which they claimed could be derived by reasonable application from the 
language of the legislature. They said it was a power ‘incidental’, ‘ancillary’, or ‘conducive’…If 
these rather loose expressions are to cover something beyond what may be found in the language 
which the legislature has used, all I can say is that, so far as I know, there is no foundation in 
principle or authority for the proposition involved in their use,’’  
 
This implies therefore that local authorities may not gain sufficient guidance from s 111(1) of the 
Local Government Act 1972, on which acts they should consider incidental to their functions 
while invoking the implied powers conferred in the section. Lack of sufficient guidance, on the 
other hand may prompt local authorities to perform any act in the umbrella of incidental to their 
functions. In other words, the section disregards the otherwise necessary precise meaning of the 
words “incidental to” which may seem to mean in “connection with’. However, this may be 
questionable as to which activities qualify to be incidental to its functions; and whether all 
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activities performed as incidental are valid and lawful. Similarly, local authorities may engage in 
activities like borrowing or engaging in financial transactions, under the umbrella of performing 
incidental activities to its functions in exploitation of the imprecise language portrayed in the 
section. 
 
Thirdly, the entire section is so widely drafted that it enables a local authority to perform, on 
“reasonableness”, almost any activity that it considers incidental to the express powers in the 
section.129 It does not attempt to set the precise limits of the powers of local authorities. The 
section confers wide discretion to local authorities’ administrators. There is high likely hood that 
the wide drafting of the section provides escape routes to local authorities to misuse the powers 
and perform unlawful activities under the guise of performing its functions employing the test of 
“reasonableness”. But it should be noted that the word “reasonableness” is ambiguous and may 
attract subjective judicial interpretation.    
 
Local authorities are empowered to perform their activities that are incidental to or consequential 
upon objects laid down under the statute, provided such activities are considered “reasonably 
incidental” and intra vires.130 But the word reasonable itself is ambiguous. Sometimes, there is 
flexibility in the rule of ultra vires and courts will validate activities of local authorities, 
considered “incidental”, although not expressly permitted by the enabling legislation. Thus, in 
Hazel v Hammersmith & Fulham131, s 111(1) was found to be used incidentally to s 137 of the 
Local Government Act, but the section cannot be invoked due to its limitations. In McCarthy & 
                                                            
129 Neil Hawke and Neil, Papworth, Introduction to Administrative Law (Cavendish Publishing 1996) 43. 
130 Attorney General v Eastern Railway [1880] 5 A.C 473. 
 
131[1992] A.C 1 at 29. 
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Stone (Developments) Ltd v Richmond Upon Thames,132 it was held that s 111(1) empowers a 
local authority to impose a charge on a person for pre planning advice. The words in brackets in 
subsection (1) were interpreted as inclusive and not exclusive. The charges therefore, were 
calculated to facilitate, or conducive or incidental to the discharge of the functions of the 
authority. Further, subsection (3) made it clear that the raising money by rate, precept or 
borrowing was within the scope of subsection (1). However, restrictions in subsection (3), that 
raising money had to be in accordance with enactments relating to those matters applied only to 
the methods of raising money specified, and did not restrict the power to raise money by charges. 
 
However, interpreting s 111(1) as an implicit authorization to a local authority to charge for 
performance of every function, in any event, instead of an express statutory authorization to 
charge is contrary to the principle identified in Attorney General v Wilts United Dairies Ltd.133 
The principle is that any authority to charge should be made clear and express by the Legislature. 
Further, it was held that charging such a fee was incidental to incidental because giving the 
advice was not a function by itself, but it was incidental to planning functions of the authority. 
So, charging for advice was incidental to incidental which was not in the scope of s 111(1). But 
in Credit Suisse v Waltham Forest London Borough Council,134it was held that the local 
authority does not act ultra vires and that it acts in the limits of s 111(1) of the Local 
Government Act 1972, when it guarantees the obligations of a company which it had helped to 
set up and to which it lent money with a view to fulfilling its obligations to house the homeless. 
At appeal, however, it was held that the authority was not entitled to discharge any of its 
                                                            
132 [1992] A.C 48, HL; see also Andrew Arden, Jonathan Manning and Scott Collins, Local Government 
Constitutional and Administrative Law( Sweet and Maxwell 1999) 73.   
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functions by means of a partly owned company. Neither does s 111 guarantee that power nor the 
power to provide assistance in form of a guarantee or indemnity to such a company could be 
implied by reference of s 111 of the Local Government Act. Also, in Akumah v Hackney LBC 
[2005]135, although it was not expressly provided by the legislation, the House of Lords held that 
it was lawful to clamp cars in a car park attached to a block of the local authority at a fee. 
Clamping cars therefore was considered to be “incidental” to the express statutory powers of 
‘management, regulation and control’ over the dwelling houses the council had, which was 
therefore interpreted broadly to include regulation of car parking.  
 
Nonetheless, local authorities have escaped judicial challenge in respect to invoking s 111on the 
basis of performing incidental functions and have continued to exploit the ambiguities, loopholes 
or uncertainties in s 111(1), and have taken ancillary activities in the name of incidental 
functions in order to increase their revenues.136  What is incidental in a particular case, as distinct 
from what is being merely an implied power, are questions in respect of which different people 
may come to different answers.137 However, it should be noted, that s111 of the Local 
Government Act 1972 cannot be invoked where there is another specific set of rules or legal 
provisions to govern such an area.138  
 
However, in absence of a carefully and objectively drafted express provision, the courts have to 
look at the general legislation in order to determine the legislative purpose that need to be 
effected. When the Legislature enacts legislation that confers wide powers and which makes no 
                                                            
135[2005] UKHL 17. 
136 John F. McEldowney, Public Law ( 2nd edn Sweet and Maxwell 1998) 411. 
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138 See Hazell (n132). 
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explicit reference to the controls which should regulate the exercise of the powers, the courts 
assume that the legislature delegated the powers to courts to control the exercise of powers by 
setting express provisions to bridge the legislative gap but in conformity with the principle of the 
rule of law.139However, a problem arises, where courts also fail, in absence of express provision 
in the legislation, to understand in which circumstance and to what extent should they intervene 
in order to review the decisions taken by local authorities in the exercise of their discretion 
provided in the enabling legislation. In any case, however, it should be emphasized that the 
courts have the right to determine what is lawful.140 
 
In most cases a number of local authorities rely on the widely drafted s 111 in order to avoid 
central government controls on borrowing and expenditure and end up in committing invalid acts 
and which are declared ultra vires by courts. For instance, in credit Suisse v Allerdale Borough 
Council141, the council did not escape judicial disapproval. Although, local authorities were 
empowered to provide recreational facilities under other relevant statutory powers, they were not 
expressly empowered to create companies in order to raise capital outside the normal limits of 
the legislation under the umbrella of incidental function.142 Nor could such a power be implied in 
s 111 of the Local Government Act 1972.  Although, the flexibility of s 111 is important for local 
authorities, the style in which it is constructed does not provide sufficient guidance in express 
terms on limits in which the authorities may exercise their powers. Local authorities are therefore 
tempted to indulge in performing activities that neither fall within the express nor implied 
                                                            
139 Elliot (n17) 21. 
140 De Smith, Woolf and Jowell’s, Principles of Judicial Review ( Sweet and Maxwell 1999) 154. 
141 [1996] 4 All ER 129. 
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powers of the local authorities.143 The implied powers in the section do not provide an escape 
route from the statutory controls. However, it would be impossible to define precisely every 
purpose for which every function has to be performed in the day to day operations of local 
authorities which probably explains the very broad power inherent in s 111 of the Local 
Government Act 1972.   
 
Thus, still, in Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham,144 the local authority invoked s 111(1) and 
although, the section empowered the local authorities with certain borrowing powers, “calculated 
to facilitate, or conducive or incidental to, the discharge of any of their functions”, the precise 
legality of such any investment was subject to doubt. It was held that the action of the authority 
was invalid and therefore ultra vires on the fact that section 111(1) conferred no express power 
to the local authority to be involved in any financial transactions, although the same section 
conferred implied power to do anything ancillary to discharge of its functions. In other words, 
the section does not provide in express terms any authority to do anything which is incidental to 
the discharge of its functions, which included borrowing, and in consideration of the limits of 
section 111, financial transactions were not calculated to facilitate, or conducive or incidental to 
the discharge of the council’s functions within the meaning of section 111 (1) of Local 
Government 1972. 
 
 
 
                                                            
143 Ibid. 
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4.2 Section 2 of the Local Government Act 2000  
 
Section 2(1) of the Local Government Act 2000 provides that: 
 
A local authority has power to do anything which they consider is likely to achieve one or more 
of the following objects: the promotion or improvement of the economic well-being of their area, 
the promotion or improvement of the environmental well-being of their area, and the promotion 
or improvement of the social well-being of their area.145 
 
Section 2(1) is drafted in broad terms that it may enable the local authorities to do anything they 
want under the guise of promoting or improving the well-fare of the inhabitants of their areas. 
Thus, in R v Enfield London Borough Council, ex parte J, 146Elias J said: 
 
‘It is drafted in broad terms which provide a source of power enabling authorities to do many 
things which they could not hitherto have done. In my view, a ‘prohibition, restriction or 
limitation’ is one which will almost always be found in an express legislative provision. I do not 
discount the possibility that such might arise by necessary implication, but I would have that 
would be very rare’. 
 
The above court case concerns an interpretation of the well-being power, in conjunction with 
other clauses concerning restrictions and prohibition in another Act. The section was broadly 
drafted to make a cross references to restrictions and limitations in other enactments. This may 
be a source of confusion and therefore an abuse of discretion, the court held that there was no 
                                                            
145 Local Government Act 2000, s 2(1). 
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need of making cross references to other legislations. While the section is drafted in broad terms 
to accommodate flexibility of the rule of ultra vires in order to confer discretion to local 
authorities, it fails to expressly define in clear terms the criteria to be applied to know what is 
likely to achieve the well-being of their areas, and to expressly accommodate restrictions and 
prohibitions in itself as to the exercise of its powers. More so, although the section is subject to 
the mentioned restrictions and limitations referred to in section 3 of the same Act, the cases on 
the use of the well-being power have confirmed its wide ranging nature.147  
 
Although, it is argued that express restrictions of the limits of powers of the local authorities 
inherent in s 2(1) would undermine the innovative initiatives in the field of promoting or 
improving the well-being of the people of their areas,148 the section fails to provide sufficient 
guidance to local authorities on how to incur its expenses and the amount of money it will spend. 
The implication is that local authorities may spend and fund any person and group of persons and 
invest in any activities, if the authorities consider that such financing and funding contribute to 
the well-being of their areas. However, it is argued again that if the section could be narrowly 
construed to provide a margin of discretion, then it would be ineffective in many cases, and it 
would be undermining the initiatives of local authorities in deciding what is best for their 
areas.149 
 
Section 2(2) (b) provides: 
 
The power under subsection (1) may be exercised in relation to or for the benefit of…. 
                                                            
147 Sharland ( n19) 96. 
148 Encyclopedia of Local Government Law,Vol 5, Par 6-1049 (R 54. February 2002).  
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(b) all or any persons resident or present in a local authority’s area. 
 
The subsection is also so broad that it provides maximum flexibility. For instance, the word 
‘persons’ is not defined in the context of the Act. However, according to Interpretation Act 1978, 
the word ‘person’ includes ‘a body of persons corporate of unincorporate’.150 Therefore, the 
word includes individuals and particular groups in the community like the children, women, 
persons with disabilities, the elderly and other several and separate legal entities in a local 
authority area like the churches, police force, business organizations and voluntary groups.151 
Further, what does “any persons resident or present’ in the local authority’s area mean? The 
subsection does not differentiate between the residents of the local authority and non residents 
like visitors (tourists, foreign students and members of the business community from other areas) 
that are staying in a local authority’s area at a given time. It is questionable, therefore, whether 
the residents or such other groups of non residents staying in the local authority’s area may be 
entitled to the same benefit by invoking s 2 of the local government Act 2000. In consideration 
of the style of how the section is drafted, however, one may not rule out the view that a local 
authority that exercises such wide discretion conferred by the widely drafted s 2 would breed 
judicial misinterpretation and consequently becomes a source of litigation.   
 
Section (2) (4) provides that: 
“The power under subsection (1) includes power for a local authority to 
(a) incur expenditure, 
(b) give financial assistance to any person, 
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(c) enter into arrangements or agreements with any person, 
(d) co-operate with, or facilitate or co-ordinate the activities of, 
any person, 
(e) exercise on behalf of any person any functions of that person, and 
(f) provide staff, goods, services or accommodation to any person’.  
 
The subsection provides a list of activities in which the authorities exercise their powers. 
However, the list shows how broad still the section is. Sub paragraphs (a) and (b) give broad 
spending powers to local authorities.152 Such broad powers conferred to the local authorities do 
not set precise limits of the authorities. This may act as a source of misuse of power and as a 
subsequent means of performing unlawful acts in the name of social-welfare of the inhabitants of 
the respective authorities. Consequently, the acts may be subject to judicial scrutiny and declared 
invalid. Also, neither does the subsection indicate what (a) incurring expenditure and (b) giving 
financial assistance mean, nor does it identify any difference between the two. Is not giving 
financial assistance to any person an expenditure of a local authority? It is. More so, both sub 
paragraphs could have been drafted together. However, the words ‘incurring expenditure’ make 
it clear that it is not a piece of guidance as to how a local authority should go about by its 
activities but as a funding power.153  
 
The power to give financial assistance conferred in subparagraph (b) enables local authorities to 
make payments to persons. The word, ‘person’ according to statutory interpretation, has its 
meaning and it includes other public bodies, profit or nonprofit incorporated bodies. The 
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subparagraph, however, does not make it clear if the assistance could be in form of grants, loans 
or guarantees. Further, the subparagraph is so wide that people can persuade courts that they can 
provide the services of which other statutory provisions could not prevent. Thus in R( 
Theophilus) v Lewisham London Borough Council, 154 the court held that s 2 (b) could be used to 
provide support to a student to enable him to pursue a degree course abroad although this was 
outside the existing regulations governing students support. 
 
The above analysis clearly shows that both of the sections are drafted in a style that enables the 
local authorities to perform activities outside their legal limits. This implies that in certain 
instances, the authorities take invalid decisions. Although, both of the sections provide flexibility 
of the principle of ultra vires, their failure to expressly spell out the necessary guidance to the 
authorities on the proper use of their discretion is quite remarkable. It is also a fact that the use of 
loose expressions in the sections is also common. Court cases affirm that such expressions do not 
provide express limits of the exercise of local authority’s powers but rather a leeway to cover 
something beyond what may be found in the language which the legislature has used. However, 
such flexibility is considered to be a foundation for initiatives of local authorities in deciding 
what is best for their areas. Nonetheless, the leeway is utilized as a misuse of the discretion of the 
conferred by legislation, it encourages application of judicial misinterpretation, leads to abuse of 
power and compromises the respect of the rule of law.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis attempted to prove that valid administrative decisions from local authorities are 
guaranteed via clear and precise enabling clauses in the primary legislation. From the above 
discussion and analysis, it is clear that local authorities in England require clear legislation which 
expressly defines the limits of their powers in order to take valid decisions. This serves two 
purposes; first the local authorities are enabled to exercise their statutory powers lawfully, and 
secondly, it facilitates judicial interpretation of the legislation and reduces subsequent litigation. 
The research conducted reveal that local authorities’ enabling clauses are drafted in wide and 
ambiguous terms. It is true therefore, that since the clauses are drafted in broad terms and do not 
provide sufficient guidance on which considerations are properly relevant to the exercise of the 
discretion of local authorities; they provide a leeway to the authorities to perform unlawful acts.   
 
However, such considerations would be a source of limitations to the authorities’ powers. This 
would be creating limits of exercising their discretion in identifying and interpreting policies, 
initiatives and procedures of achieving what is best for the inhabitants of their areas. Since local 
authorities are autonomous, such control of their discretion would be interfering with their 
autonomy. This implies that local authorities will be deprived of a certain minimum level of 
freedom and autonomy to think of what is best for their areas. But again it was further discovered 
that where the local authorities’ legislation confers unrestricted and subjective discretion to the 
local authorities through obscure and ambiguous expressions, the authorities tend to stray beyond 
their statutory powers and perform unlawful acts.  However, in some contexts, where the 
flexibility of the principle of ultra vires is necessary, the use of discretion may be preferable. 
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Also, since the Legislature does not legislate for every detail for the implementation of the policy 
the legislation carries, but only sets out the general policy and principles on which it is to be 
operated, then the existence of discretion in the local authority legislation is paramount. But there 
are still situations in which discretion would not be welcomed but rather resort to clear, express 
and rigid rules and be respected accordingly.  Nonetheless, it would be unfair to say that 
discretion is unnecessary in the local authorities’ legislation but instead, discretion can be used 
properly and it should not be opposed. However, there is need for the legislature to determine the 
right degree of discretion in every particular case.  
 
Despite the necessity of discretion, various judicial cases indicated in this thesis suggest that 
where local authorities invoke widely drafted enabling clauses; their decisions may be declared 
invalid and ultra vires. In some cases also local authorities tend to take decisions unreasonably or 
against the intentions of the legislation in question. Therefore, courts’ intervention to control the 
invalidity of such decisions of local authorities is justified since local authorities exceed their 
powers conferred by the legislation. It therefore follows that when drafting enabling clauses, it is 
important to determine their precise purpose and what they are designed to achieve.  
 
Although courts are primarily responsible for interpretation of legislation, their common law role 
of filling the legislative vacuum is recognized as well. However, this does not mean that courts 
can challenge the validity of legislation. Through the exercise of judicial powers, courts instead 
ensure that authorities do not exceed or abuse their statutory powers, but the concept of 
separation of powers is relevant here. The courts should not substitute their own decisions on the 
merits of the case for those of the local authorities on whom the power was conferred but instead 
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courts should ensure that decision makers operate within the rule of law. This implies that 
decisions taken are within the power conferred, they are not simply arbitrary, that the decision 
makers themselves are not above the law and that local authorities are accountable before the law 
for their decisions.  
 
Research conducted also established that most of the local authorities’ legislation are drafted in 
loose language reflecting the fact that the legislature accepted both the need for local variation in 
service provision, and the competence of local authorities’ administrators to make valid 
decisions. Further, research has proved that absence of clear and express legal limits in the local 
authorities’ legislation is common and leads to misinterpretation and misuse of the powers of 
local authorities. Consequently, the authorities take decisions outside the boundaries of their 
legal limits, and the courts might be reluctant to apply the principle of ultra vires to local 
authorities acting under such loosely drafted enabling legislations.155 This remains a critical 
question as courts have repeatedly affirmed their reluctance to invalidate certain decisions of 
local authorities taken in the exercise of discretion which is not limited by the express enabling 
clauses.156 Although, courts are ill- equipped to decide certain issues, they maintain the right to 
determine which decisions of the local authorities are valid and therefore it is of utmost 
importance that local authority enabling clauses are drafted clearly, simply and precisely. But as 
earlier mentioned the legislation of the local authority is unclear and drafted in broad terms. 
Drafters therefore should give as high a priority to clarity and simplicity of expression as to the 
purpose of the legislation. Policy makers, on the other hand, should at all times be asking 
                                                            
155 Ian Loveland, Constitutional Law, Administrative Law and Human Rights: A critical Introduction (5th edn 
Oxford University Press 2009) 321. 
156 De Smith (n 147)153. 
   
50 
 
themselves and the drafters whether enabling clauses are capable of expression in clear and 
express language.  
 
Research has further established that local authority enabling legislation has been drafted in a 
style that accommodates flexibility of the principle of ultra vires. This enables Local authorities 
perform certain activities considered to be ‘reasonably incidental’ to the express powers although 
not expressly authorized by the legislation.157 Research has indicated, however, that not all 
activities performed by local authorities under the umbrella of performing incidental functions 
are lawful. It has been established that certain activities are permitted by courts to be incidental 
to express powers on the basis of case by case because cases have different facts. It is therefore a 
matter of analyzing case by case and statutory powers. But courts do not have the expertise to 
know which incidental activities which are beneficial to the authorities, and the legislature does 
not provide sufficient guidance on what incidental activities are. However, where a local 
authority exercises discretion, it has to be done in accordance with rules of reason and natural 
justice not according to private opinion, but according to the purpose of the legislation and the 
interest of the public. It should not be arbitrary or in a vague manner but in a legal fashion.  
 
Further, and more important, it has been established that the style of drafting of local authorities’ 
legislation has been subject to judicial criticisms in England. As a result, courts’ interpretation of 
the legislation has provided specific legal meaning to the words the drafter has used. Words such 
as “may” and “it shall be lawful” are prima facie to be construed as permissive, not imperative. 
However, they may be interpreted as imposing a duty to act in a particular manner.158 In view of 
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the above, imprecision and ambiguity, on the other hand, inherent in the local authority enabling 
clauses raise questions concerning applicability, predictability and certainty of the legislation in 
certain instances. As has been highlighted, exercising powers conferred in such enabling clauses 
is a cause of judicial controversy and a basis of invalidity of local authorities’ decisions. 
Consequently, this provides sufficient grounds to justify the need for courts’ intervention to 
establish the overall purpose of the legislation and to maintain the rule of law.  
 
Since it is an established fact that invoking broad and obscure enabling clauses with wide powers 
coupled with insufficient legislative guidance is a substantial cause of controversy, a justification 
for judicial misinterpretation, a leeway for local authorities to engage in improper purposes and 
thus a ground for taking invalid decisions, therefore, drafting of the local authority legislation 
that clearly and expressly determines its exact scope, through the interpretation of the legislation 
in its context, can be of great practical significance. Good drafting leads to simplicity and clarity 
in legislation. In addition to clarity and simplicity, the drafter must avoid ambiguity and ensure 
that the law is accurately stated to provide sufficient guidance to local authorities’ administrators. 
Precision in the law amounts to certainty in the law, which is in fact the very function of written 
law. It would be unreasonable to draft in principles so broad that the effect of the legislation 
could not be assessed without incurring the expense of litigation. Drafters should always speak 
of clarity, simplicity and brevity in their drafting but certainty should be paramount. And since 
ambiguity is the most serious disease in legislation, therefore drafters, while drafting local 
authority legislation, should use a language which is clear, precise and unambiguous to avoid 
causing doubt to those the legislation applies. However, some experts assert that clarity in 
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drafting is paramount. Some stress accuracy. Others emphasize that both are essential.159 All in 
all, drafters have a responsibility to pay much attention to clarity, precision and unambiguity as 
tools for effectiveness of local authority legislation because clarity, precision and unambiguity in 
legislation ensure intelligibility, predictability, certainty of the legislation and therefore pave a 
way for valid decisions.  
 
Finally, local authority legislation needs to clearly and expressly spell out the limits of the local 
authorities to ensure that decision makers operate within the rule of law, take non arbitral 
decisions and within the power conferred by the enabling clause of the primary legislation, that 
the decision makers themselves are not above the law, that the legislation give rise to no serious 
controversy and reduce subsequent judicial misinterpretation of the law and that the legislation 
provides equal access to participation in the implementation of the relevant policy for good 
governance of the local authorities. All these values are achieved through clear, precise and 
understandable legislation and it is from this point that one can assert that the statement that valid 
local authorities’ decisions are guaranteed via clear and precise enabling clauses in the primary 
legislation.  
                                                            
159 Stark (n 99) 207. 
   
53 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
A. CASES 
1. Attorney General v Crayford Urban District Council [1962] 2 W.L.R 998 
2. Attorney General v Eastern Railway [1880] 5 AC. 
3. Attorney General v Fulham Corporation (1921) 
4. Attorney General v Fulham Corporation [1921] 1 Ch. 440  
5. Attorney General v Wilts United Diaries (1921) 37 TLR 884,  
6. Backhouse v Lambeth London Borough Council [1972]  116 SJ 802 
7. Boroness Wenlock v River Dee co. (1885) 10AC 354 at 362 
8. Bromley LBC v GLC [1983] AC. 768, HL 
9. Coney v Choyce [1975] 1 ALL ER 979 
10. Credit Suisse v Allerdale Borough Council (1994) 
11. Crédit Suisse v Allerdale Borough Council [1997] QB 306 
12. DPP v Hutchinson [1990] 2 AC 783  
13. Galloway v Mayor and commonalty of London (1866) L.R. 1 HL.  
14. Hazell v Hammersmith & Fulham LBC [1992] AC 1   
15. Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council [1991] 1 All ER  
16. Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council [1991] 2 WLR 372 
17. Manchestership Canal v Manchester Racecourse Co [1900] 2  
18. McCarthy & Stone (Developments) Ltd v  Richmond Upon Thames LBC [1992] A.C 48, 
HL 
19. Merkur Island shipping corp. v Laughton and others [1983] 2 AC  
20. Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC  
   
54 
 
21. R. (Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health [2003] 2 W.L.R 692, 697  
22. R. Secretary of State for Social Services, ex p. Association of Metropolitan Authorities 
[1986] 1 W.L.R. 1 
23. R. v Devon CC, ex p. Baker [1995] 1 All ER  
24. R. v Inner London Education Authority, ex. P. Westminister City Council [1986] 1 
W.L.R. 28 
25. R. v Somerset County Council ex p Fewings [1995] 3 ALL ER  
26. Slattery v Naylor (1888) 13 A.C. 446  
27. Staden  v Tarjanyi (1980) 78 LGR   
28. Strickland v Hayes [1896] QBD  
29. Taylor Munrow[1960] 1 WLR 151 
30. Westminster City Council v National Asylum Support Service [2002] UKHL)  
 
B. LEGISLATIONS  
1. Human Rights Act 1998  
2. Local Government Act 1972 
3. Local Government Act 2000 
 
C. BOOKS 
1. Anne Siedman, Robert B. Seidman and Nalin Abeyesekere, Legislative Drafting for 
Democratic Social Change: A Manual for Drafter (The Hague: Kruwer Law 
International, 2001)  
   
55 
 
2. AP Le Sueur and J W Herberg, Constitutional and Administrative Law (Cavendish 
Publishing Limited 1995)  
3. Arden Chambers, A Guide to Greater London Authority (Sweet and Maxwell 2000)  
4. B.L Jones and K Thompson, Garner’s Administrative Law (8th edn Butterworths 1996)  
5. Bailey, Jones and Mowbray: Cases, Materials and Commentary on Administrative Law 
(4th edn Sweet and Maxwell 2005)   
6. Barbara Turner, Law for Councillors (Sweet and Maxwell 1986)  
7. Brian Thompson, Textbook on Constitutional and Administrative Law (2nd edn 
Blackstone Press Limited 1995)  
8. Constantin stefanou and Helen Xanthaki (eds), Drafting Legislation: A Modern Approach 
(Ashgate Publishing Co 2008)  
9. D R Miers and A C Page, Legislation (Sweet and Maxwell 1982)  
10. D. J. Galliga, Administrative Law (Oxford University Press 1996)  
11. Daniel Greenberg, Craies on Legislation (9th edn Sweet and Maxwell 2008)  
12. David Foulkes, Administrative Law (8th edn Butterworths 1995) 
13. De Smith, Woolf and Jowell’s, Principles of Judicial Review (Sweet and Maxwell 1999)  
14. Elizabeth Yates, Local Authorities and outside organizations: A Legal Perspective 
(Sweet and Maxwell 1996)  
15. G.C Thornton, Legislative Drafting (4th ed Butterworths1996)  
16. H W Fowler and Jessie Coulson, Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (CT Onions ed 3rd 
edn, OUP 1973)  
17. Hilaire Barnett, Constitutional and Administrative Law (8th edn Cavendish Publishing 
Limited 2011)  
   
56 
 
18. Hugh Southey, Judicial Review: A Practical Guide (Jordan Publishing Limited 2004) 39 
19. HWR. Wade and C.F Forsyth, Administrative Law (10th ed Oxford University Press 
2009) 
20. Ian leigh, Law, Politics, and Local Democracy (Oxford University Press 2000)  
21. Jack Stark, The Art of the Statute (Littleton 1996)  
22. JF Burrows and RI Carter, Statute in New zealand (4th edn LexisNexis 2009)  
23. JF Burrows and RI Carter, Statute Law in New Zealand (4th edn LexisNexis 2009)  
24. John Bell and George Eangle, Statutory interpretation (Butterworths 1995) (any poorly 
drafted provision can be cited, see as in John Bell same in the footnotes, same page ) 
25. John F. McEldowney, Public Law ( 2nd edn Sweet and Maxwell 1998) 
26. John Sharland, A Practical Approach to Local Government Law (2nd ed Oxford 
University Press 2006)  
27. Jonathan Manning, Judicial Review Proceedings: A Practitioner’s guide to Advice and 
Representation (2nd edn 2004)  
28. Keith Davis, Local Government Law( Butterworths 1983)  
29. Mark Elliot, Jackson Beatson, Martin Mathews, Administrative Law: Text and Materials, 
(Jack Beatson and Martin Mathew 4th edn, Oxford University Press 2005)  
30. Mark Elliott, Jack Beatson, Martin Mathews, Administrative Law: Text and Materials 
(Jack Beatson and Martin Mathews 4th edn, Oxford University Press 2005)  
31. Martin Loughlin, Legality and Locality: The Role of Law in Central-Local Government 
Relations ( Clarendon Press 1996)   
32. Martin Loughlin, Local Government in the Modern State (Sweet and Maxwell 1986)  
   
57 
 
33. Neil Hawke and Neil, Papworth, Introduction to Administrative Law (Cavendish 
Publishing 1996)  
34. Neil Parpworth, Constitutional and Administrative Law (2nd edn Oxford University Press 
2010) 
35. O. Hood Phillips and Paul Jackson, Constitutional and Administrative Law (7th ed Sweet 
and Maxwell 1987)  
36. Paul Craig, Administrative Law (6th edn Sweet and Maxwell 2008) 
37. Peter Butt and Richard Castle, Modern Legal Drafting: A Guide to Using Clearer 
Language (2nd edn CUP 2006)  
38. Peter Cane, Administrative Law (4th edn Oxford University Press 2004)  
39. Peter Goodrich, Reading the Law: A critical Introduction to Legal Method and 
Techniques (Blackwell Ltd 1986)  
40. R Dickerson, The Fundamentals of Legal Drafting (2nd edn 1996) in Robert J Martineau 
Michael B Salemo, Legal, Legislative, and Rule Drafting in Plain English (Thomson 
2005)  
41. Revision Work Book, Administrative Law, (2nd edn Old Bailey Press 2002)  
42. Richard Gordon, Judicial Review: Law and Procedure (2nd edn Sweet and Maxwell 
1996)  
43. Rick Bigwood (ed), The Statute: Making and Meaning (LexisNexis 2004)  
44. SH Bailey, cross on principles of Local Government Law (3rd edn Sweet and Maxwell 
2004)  
45. Soanes (ed), Compact Oxford English Dictionary (2nd edn OUP , Oxford 2003)  
46. Timothy Endicott, Administrative Law (2nd edn Oxford University press 2011)  
   
58 
 
 
D. ARTICLES  
1. Ester Majambere, ‘Clarity, Precision and unambiguity: aspects for effective legislative 
drafting’,(2011) 37 (3) SLR  419  
2. Brian Hunt, ‘Plain Language in Legislative Drafting: An Achievable Objective or A 
Laudable Ideal?’ (2003) 24 (3) SLR 114  
3. First Report ‘The Legislative Process’, House of Commons Session 1997-98 (Cmnd. 
190). 
4. H Xanthaki, ‘On Transferability of Legislative Solutions: The Functionality Test’ in: C 
Stefanou and Helen Xanthaki (eds), Drafting Legislation: A Modern Approach (Ashgate, 
Aldershot 2008)  
5. I.M.L Turnbull, ‘Clear Legislative Drafting: New Approaches in Australia’(1990) Vol. 
11 SLR 164  
6. Kadija Kabba, ‘Gender Neutral- Language: an essential language tool to serve precision, 
clarity and unambiguity’(2011) 37  (3) SLR 430 
7. Sandra C Markman, ‘Training of Legislative Counsel: learning to draft without Neille’ 
(2010) 36 (1) SLR 25 
D. REPORTS  
1. The Renton Report on The preparation of Legislation CMND 6053 (1975)   
 
